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ARTICLE

Reforming the International
Investment Law System
SIMON LESTER†

I.

INTRODUCTION

Free trade and trade agreements have a perception problem these
days: critics say they are designed for the benefit of big corporations,
and that trade’s negative impact on ordinary people is ignored.1 For
the most part, this perception is false. When tariffs and other
protectionist trade barriers come down, companies are forced to
compete. There are winners and losers in the corporate world from
this competition, but the biggest winners are consumers. 2 It is
ordinary people who experience the most significant economic gains
from free trade.3
† Simon Lester is a Trade Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute.
1. See, e.g., Mark Weisbrot, Tricks of Free Trade, SIERRA MAG.,
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200109/weisbrot_printable.asp (“We give up our
jobs and environmental safeguards for the greater glory of transnational
corporations.”).
2. As a leading economics textbook puts it: “[W]hen trade has opened up, and
when each country concentrates on its area of comparative advantage, everyone is
better off. . . When borders are opened to international trade, the national income
of each and every trading country rises. . . An ill-designed tariff or quota, far from
helping consumers in a country, will instead reduce their real incomes by making
imports expensive and by making the whole world less productive. Countries lose
from protectionism because reduced international trade eliminates the efficiency
inherent in specialization and division of labor.” PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM
D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 904 (13th ed. 1989).
3. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, Exec. Office of
the President, NAFTA Benefits (October 2007), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/N
AFTA%20Benefits.pdf.
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There is one notable exception to this defense of trade
agreements, however: the international investment law system,
which has been incorporated into trade agreements, gives special
rights to sue governments exclusively to foreign investors.4 When
you look around the world today, you see many people being treated
badly by their own governments. People who are being oppressed on
the basis of their religion, race or gender; people whose property has
been stolen; and people who are being treated unjustly for no
apparent reason at all. Do any of these ordinary people have access
to enforceable international law to assert their rights against their own
governments? For the most part, they do not. But foreign investors
do. As a result, the criticism of trade agreements as constituting
special favors for big corporations has some resonance when the
investment law system is at issue.
Some might argue that even if this criticism were true, there are
benefits to this system, in the form of economic welfare gains that
make the system worthwhile despite any appearance of bias. In truth,
such benefits have not been demonstrated.5
In fact, the problem the system addresses has not even been
defined. What exactly is the problem that needs to be addressed by
an elaborate system of investment obligations and international
tribunals? It turns out we do not really have a clear answer. We are
operating under assumptions from decades ago, which have not been
adjusted as the world has changed.
In this paper, I offer a critique of the existing system in three
parts. First, I question whether there is much of a problem with bad
treatment of foreign investment by governments that needs to be
addressed. If actual treatment of foreign investors is generally good,
concerted international action is unnecessary. Second, I argue that the
nature of capital flows today means that referring to investment as
“foreign” overlooks the reality of today’s interdependent economic
world. Globalization has led to transnational companies that operate
4. These rights were originally found in bilateral investment treaties, but they
have now spread to the investment chapters of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral
trade agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement. North
American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
5. See Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible
Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign
Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 827–28 (2008) (“While I find
some tentative evidence that privatization programs and the World Bank’s
investment insurance program may promote FDI, my results suggest that BITs have
little or no impact on investment decisions . . .”).
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around the world, and are not “foreign” and “domestic” in the sense
they used to be. And, third, I explore the nature of the international
judicial review that the international investment law system has made
available, and ask whether we have gone too far in creating
international “constitutional” courts. Judicial review is well-accepted
in the domestic sphere, but in the international context it is still novel
and unexplored.
Finally, I consider alternative approaches to addressing any
problems that do arise in relation to the treatment of investment, such
as improving the domestic law protections in nations where problems
exist, and encouraging private companies to take on more
responsibility for their own protection. I conclude that the real issues
that exist here can be dealt with in these more productive ways.
II.

IS THERE A PROBLEM WITH BAD TREATMENT OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT?

If you look back at the situation of 100 years ago, or even 60
years ago, foreign investors were often treated badly. The world that
existed at that time was much less democratic, with many
authoritarian governments having shifting views on foreign
investment, alternately encouraging it and then expropriating it. 6 In
the post-colonial world of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, economic
nationalism was on the rise, and newly empowered developing
nations began to take back what they believed was theirs. 7 In many
cases, this was accomplished through expropriation of physical
assets.8 This era was a challenging one for Western multinationals
who had invested in the developing world.
To deal with this situation, these companies lobbied their own
governments for international treaties that would give them recourse
in neutral international courts, which could handle any disputes that
arose.9 This approach appealed to the governments themselves,
6. One prominent example is the Mexican expropriation of foreign oil
companies’ assets. See Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, Mexican
Expropriation
of
Foreign
Oil
(last
visited
Mar.
13,
2015),
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/mexican-oil/.
7. Stephen J. Kobrin, Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms
in LDCs: Trends from 1960-1979, 28 INT’L STUD. Q. 329, 344 (1984).
8. Id.; See also J. Frederick Truitt, Expropriation of Foreign Investment:
Summary of the Post World War II Experience of American and British Investors in
the Less Developed Countries, 1 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 21, 23–30 (1970) (detailing
expropriation and nationalization by sector).
9. An early effort in this regard was the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of
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which did not like having to engage in the diplomacy of defending
their companies’ rights.10 In the 1960s and 1970s, templates for such
treaties were developed and applied, and soon proliferated. By 2012,
there were nearly 3,200 agreements on foreign investment, either as
free-standing treaties or chapters of trade agreements.11
While this process was taking place, however, attitudes towards
foreign investment changed in most of the world. Economic
nationalism faded and governments began to court investors. Today,
a typical story about large foreign investments will note the subsidies
offered by the government to attract that investment.12
To a great extent, then, bad treatment of foreign investment is a
problem of an earlier era. While there are a small number of nations
which threaten expropriation or actually expropriate foreign
investors’ property, the frequency of such acts is down
considerably. 13 According to one economist, the number of direct
expropriation acts was 136 in the 1960s and 423 in the 1970s, but has
since declined to only 17 in the 1980s, 22 in the 1990s, and 27
instances in the 2000s, through 2006.14
In the face of this empirical data, it is not completely clear what
the problem is that the investment law system seeks to address. If
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. See Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, ch. 1, § 1, art. 1, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (“The
purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of
investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting
States in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.”) [hereinafter ICSID
Convention].
10. Prior to the ICSID Convention, the traditional view was that States alone
had jurisdiction to approach an international tribunal. P. F. Sutherland, The World
Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 28 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.,
367, 372 (1979).
11. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II,
18, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2013/2 (2014) [hereinafter UNCTAD].
12. As a recent example, Alabama provided $158 million in financial and
logistical support to attract an Airbus manufacturing plant. Jon Ostrower, Alabama
Puts Airbus Incentives at $158 Million, WALL ST. J., Jul. 9, 2012,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304022004577516922037292712.
Overall, U.S. state and local government subsidies have increased from $26.4
billion in 1996 to $46.8 billion in 2005. Emerging countries such as Brazil, China,
Vietnam, and India also provide significant investment subsidies. KENNETH P.
THOMAS, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES AND THE GLOBAL COMPETITION FOR CAPITAL 2
(2011).
13. See Christopher Hajzler, Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investments:
Sectoral Patterns from 1993 to 2006, 148 REV. WORLD ECON. 119, 127–28 (2012).
14. Id.
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expropriation is rare today, what exactly is the problem? And where
is it a problem? This issue has simply not been studied. With no data
on the nature and extent of the problems faced by foreign investors, it
is hard to craft appropriate rules to address such problems. What we
do know is that, a few outliers aside, direct expropriation has greatly
diminished as an issue faced by investors. Beyond expropriation,
investment rules also require fair and equitable treatment. But to
what degree do investors face treatment that is not “fair” or
“equitable”? And what kind of treatment is this exactly? These
terms are so broad and vague that is hard to say with any certainty
what government behavior is at issue here. 15
Staying with the world of data, despite arguments that
investment obligations help “promote” foreign investment, the
evidence on this point is mixed. Examinations of the impact of such
rules on investment flows are not supportive of the claimed benefits. 16
And some countries, such as Brazil, which is famously resistant to
investment treaties, 17 have had no problem attracting investment.18
In reality, the biggest problem in the world of foreign
investment may not be bad treatment, but treatment that is too good
to these investors: subsidies. As noted, subsidies to attract foreign
investors have proliferated.19 If there is a problem with foreign
15. See, e.g., UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on
Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 1–12, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIA/IA/2011/5 (2012) (“the vague and broad wording of the obligation
carries a risk of an overreach in its application”; “The vagueness of the FET
standard is at the core of the problem”; “the legal building blocks for the analysis of
the international minimum standard and its role in international investment law are
precarious and often incomplete, vague and contested”; “It has even been suggested
that due to its extreme vagueness the FET obligation lacks legitimacy as a legal
norm”).
16. See Yackee, supra note 5; Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment
Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative
Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 399 (2010). (“[S]cholars have not yet been able to
provide anything close to a definitive answer of whether BITs indeed achieve their
central purpose: increased flows of investment.”).
17. See Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 269 n.19
(2008) (“Brazil did not sign a BIT until 1994, and none of its ten bilateral
agreements had entered into force as of the late 1990s.”).
18. Brazil is ranked number twelve worldwide in “stock of direct foreign
investment
–
at home.” Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2198rank.
html?countryname=Brazil&countrycode=br&regionCode=soa&rank=12#br.
19. See Kenneth Thomas, Commentary, Investment Incentives and the Global
Competition for Capital, COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, No. 54, Dec. 30, 2011,
available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_54.pdf (“Investment
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investment that needs to be addressed, it is this one. When
governments use subsidies to compete for investment, no new
investment is created. The only impact is to shift investment around
from location to location, in a way that benefits the large corporations
who receive these subsidies.
III. IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD, WHAT IS “FOREIGN” INVESTMENT?
A hundred years ago, the global economy could much more
easily be divided along national lines. Many companies had a clear
nationality, and when they invested their money abroad, they
maintained that nationality to a great extent.20 Foreign investment
typically meant big Western companies investing in developing
countries, often in the natural resource sector (and this is where
problems with bad treatment typically arose). 21
The modern economy looks different from this older period.
Today’s foreign investment flows in much more varied ways. It is not
just Western companies investing in the developing world. It is a
wide range of companies of many nationalities, investing all over the
world and creating global supply chains and operations. 22 Companies
might have their headquarters in one country, develop technology in
another, raise capital around the world, and produce their goods in
multiple countries. And the nationality of the owners might not match
up with any of these countries.
In this light, the notions of “foreign” and “domestic” investment
have much less meaning than they once did. It is thus misleading to
think about investors as having a particular nationality, e.g., as
“American” or “Korean” or “Mexican.” While particular companies
incentives (subsidies designed to affect the location of investment) are a pervasive
feature of global competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). They are used by
the vast majority of countries, at multiple levels of government, in a broad range of
industries.”).
20. For example, the United Fruit Company (Chiquita) or the American Sugar
Refining Company (Domino), which operated in the Caribbean and Latin America.
See Marcelo Bucheli, Multinational Corporations, Totalitarian Regimes and
Economic Nationalism: United Fruit Company in Central America, 1899-1975, 50
BUS. HISTORY 433, 434 (2008) (discussing the relationship between multinational
corporations and dictators in Central America).
21. Id. at 437.
22. Ford Motor Co., Form 10-K (last visited Mar. 13, 2015),
http://corporate.ford.com/doc/sr13-form-10-k.pdf [hereinafter Ford Motor Co.];
Toyota
Motor Corp., Form 20-F (last visited Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.toyotaglobal.com/investors/ir_library/sec/pdf/20-F_201403_final.pdf [hereinafter Toyota
Motor Corp.].
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may have a majority of shareholders who are citizens of a given
country, or may have their headquarters in a particular jurisdiction,
transnational corporations are fundamentally “citizens of the world.”
Their owners can and do move production and other operations to
wherever they perceive to be the best location.
To take some examples from the auto industry, in the practice of
U.S. trade and investment policy, Ford is considered an “American”
company, and the U.S. government often negotiates on its behalf in
trade and investment agreements.23 But does it make sense to think of
Ford this way? Total U.S. employment for Ford in the manufacturing
sector is about 43,000, but Ford employs more than 145,000 people
worldwide in 55 different production facilities. 24 Along the same
lines, Toyota is thought of a “Japanese” company. While there are
over 140,000 employees in Japan, Toyota has overseas employment
of close to 200,000. It has factories in North America, Latin America,
Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia, and the Middle East.25
Clearly, both of these companies operate globally and are not
purely “American” or “Japanese.” The question thus arises: should
the historical origin of a corporation or the nationality of its
shareholders really play such a decisive role in the legal treatment of
these corporations under international investment law? Why should
the U.S. government push for protections for Ford abroad but not
Toyota abroad? The nationality-based approach to the protections
offered under these treaties does not reflect the way many companies
operate in today’s investment world.
To take an example from recent headlines, Burger King recently
merged with the Canadian donut company Tim Horton’s and, in the
process, became part of a parent company based in Canada.26 Now
that Burger King has become an investment of a “Canadian”
corporation (i.e., the parent company), can it sue the U.S. government
under the NAFTA investment rules27 if a future Mayor Bloomberg
were to mandate size limits on donuts because of health concerns?
23. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE U.S.-SOUTH KOREA
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (KORUS FTA): PROVISIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 3 n.3
(Sept. 16, 2014) (discussing an automotive trade commitment reached by the U.S.
and South Korea that was a priority for the Ford Motor Co.).
24. Ford Motor Co., supra note 22.
25. Toyota Motor Corp., supra note 22.
26. Liz Hoffman & Dana Mattioli, Burger King in Talks to Buy Tim Hortons in
Canada
Tax
Deal,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Aug.
25,
2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/burger-king-in-talks-to-buy-tim-hortons-1408924294.
27. NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1116.
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This example shows that the formal nationality of companies has
become increasingly arbitrary over the years and does not serve as a
good basis for imposing investment obligations on governments.
IV. WHAT SCOPE FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW?
International investment obligations provide for the judicial
review of domestic laws, regulation, and other government measures.
This proposition is controversial, 28 because it allows international
courts to interfere with democratic decision-making. However, the
extent of the controversy depends on the scope of the obligations.
Such obligations can be narrowly drawn to target specific kinds of
actions, such as protection of domestic industries. Or they can be
more wide-ranging and open-ended, along the lines of rights-based
judicial review as seen in the domestic constitutional law context.29 I
argue in this section that a focus on non-discrimination can be
politically workable, but more expansive obligations such as “fair and
equitable” treatment are not appropriate.
Non-discrimination is at the core of international economic
relations. 30 It includes both national treatment, which means not
discriminating against foreign goods, services, or capital; and most
favored nation treatment, which means not discriminating among
goods, services, or capital of different nations. Such a rule promotes
good international relations and good economics; without a nondiscrimination norm, protectionist measures can proliferate and
economic alliances can stand in the way of peaceful trade relations.
A non-discrimination rule is narrow and bounded. Under such
an obligation, a government can regulate however it likes, and based
on whatever policy it chooses, as long as the measure is nondiscriminatory. For example, a government could require that
automobiles have a certain level of fuel efficiency, but it could not
impose harsher requirements on foreign-made cars than domestic28. One need only look at the Australian plain packaging complaint to see the
depth of the strong feelings about this issue. Cigarette maker Philip Morris
International has challenged an Australian law that requires cigarette producers to
sell cigarettes in plain packaging. See Rebecca Thurlow, Australian CigarettePackaging
Curbs
Prompt
Suit,
WALL ST. J., Nov 21, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702044
43404577051361355154868.
29. The fair and equitable treatment and expropriation provisions fall into this
category.
30. JOHN H. JACKSON ET. AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 537 (5th ed. 2008).
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made ones.
By contrast, international obligations relating to subjects such as
direct expropriation, indirect expropriation, and “fair and equitable
treatment” are much broader. They all have parallels in domestic
constitutional and administrative law, and, at least in theory, offer a
form of these protections as international law. That causes a much
broader intrusion into domestic, democratic decision-making, and is
the source of much of the criticism of the investment law system.
“Fair and equitable” treatment in particular has been the subject
of much criticism in the context of the investment system. 31
Concerns about its scope have led governments to try to put
boundaries on it. 32 However, these attempts do not show much
promise. A recent effort by the European Union and Canada as part
of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
leaves us with obligations that still look quite broad and undefined.
The CETA includes “manifest arbitrariness” and “fundamental
breach of due process” as examples of such treatment.33
Unfortunately, such terms raise more questions about the scope of the
obligations than they answer. What exactly are the limits of these
obligations? What types of government actions might violate them?
No doubt creative lawyers are already thinking about the possibilities,
even before the CETA is signed.
International judicial review is not objectionable in and of itself,
of course. Specific proposals for such review should be considered
on their merits. But the nature of the obligations, the parties which
have access to legal recourse under them, and how and by what
means they are enforced, needs to be considered carefully as part of
the debate over the scope and nature of the international legal system.
Having open-ended provisions that are available only to foreign
investors contributes to the perception that international economic
31. UNCTAD, supra note 15.
32. One example is the NAFTA parties’ attempt to clarify the minimum
standard of treatment in 2001. See International Institute For Sustainable
Development, Note on NAFTA Commission’s July 31, 2001, Initiative to Clarify
Chapter 11 Investment Provisions, (last visited Mar. 13, 2015),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2001/trade_nafta_aug2001.pdf (“This broad interpretation
of minimum standards of treatment—essentially giving firms the right to litigate
any international law obligation—has not been seen outside [o]f the NAFTA
context. The statement puts an end to this. It brings us back to an
interpretation . . .that corresponds to customary international law . . . .”).
33. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. X.9, Oct.
18,
2013,
Consolidated
CETA
Text,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.
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law is a corporate handout, with ordinary people ignored.34
V.

CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVE WAYS FORWARD

To a great extent, we have been stuck in the same debate for
decades: do investment obligations, as currently written, promote and
protect foreign investment, as supporters say? Or do they give
corporations special rights and undermine the state’s sovereign
regulatory and legislative powers, as critics allege? It would be
helpful to step outside this all or nothing dichotomy and think
critically about some of the more specific issues that arise in this
context.
First, it would be a great idea for investment generally, both
foreign and domestic, if we could elevate property rights and
discourage expropriation. Unfortunately, current efforts in the
international arena are weak and isolated. These rights are only
provided to a limited group (that is, to foreign investors) and under an
uncertain and unpredictable quasi-judicial framework. If we want
property rights to be taken seriously, we need to promote them as a
matter of domestic law, rather than offer an ad hoc system only to
foreign investors. A treaty could help in this regard, if it established
global minimum standards and required their adoption in domestic
34. Even domestic investors do not have the protections given to their foreign
counterparts. The Economist recently reported on a Chinese hotel owner whose
property was taken by local Chinese government authorities:
Mr Qiao says he was abducted and held for 13 hours last December as
the building was demolished by what he describes as a network of
corrupt officials and developers. All of its contents were lost.
Mr Qiao’s story is far from unique. Since the mid-1990s, tens of
millions of Chinese have lost their land. In many cases, only minimal
compensation has been offered. Researchers believe that, of thousands
of “mass incidents” of rural unrest occurring each year, the majority are
about land. In one of the worst recent cases, nine people were killed in
mid-October in Yunnan province in the south-west in a dispute over
evictions.
In their campaign for redress, Mr Qiao and his son have been stymied
at every turn. Local police did not respond when thugs broke the Qiaos’
windows. The electricity bureau did nothing when power to his
building was cut. Planning officials scoffed at his request for adequate
compensation for the loss of his business. The Qiaos informally
approached a local court to assess their chances of suing the
government successfully. They were given a brush-off.
“The Law at Work: No More Rooms,” ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21629538-against-network-officials-andthugs-law-no-shield-no-more-rooms.
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law. For example, a treaty could set out guidelines for how and when
governments should provide compensation for expropriation. Such an
approach has the benefit of helping not just foreign investors, but
domestic ones as well. Canada is famous for having weak
protections against expropriation.35 The solution to this problem,
however, is not to grant protections to foreign investors through
investment and trade agreements. Rather, it is to give such
protections to all investors through changes in Canadian law. In this
way, trade agreements would be seen as about protection of rights for
everyone, including ordinary people, rather than just the rich and
well-connected.
Second, foreign investors need to take responsibility for their
business decisions. There is risk in any investment; there is more risk
when investing in some countries than in others. Companies have a
responsibility to know this and plan for it, and, in fact, it is not hard
to do so. Companies that make foreign investments can buy political
risk insurance; and they can demand arbitration clauses in any foreign
investment contracts they sign with host governments. This approach
addresses the problem without creating an overbroad international
constitutional system.
Third, with respect to that international constitutional system,
we need to think critically about the distinctions between different
possible international legal obligations in international economic
agreements. It is one thing to say that governments should promise
not to discriminate against each other’s foreign investments. The
benefits are clear, and the scope is limited. It is quite another,
however, to create a general “due process” type obligation for
governments, such as “fair and equitable” treatment, that is overseen
35. See Mark Milke, Stealth Confiscation: Property Takings via Regulation,
FRASER FORUM, May/June 2012, at 22, www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/
fraser-ca/Content/research-news/research/articles/stealth-confiscation-propertytakings-via-regulations-ff.pdf (“Canada fares poorly in the protection of all sorts of
property rights protection including, and especially in, the case of regulatory
takings.”); Bryan P. Schwartz & Melanie R. Bueckert, Regulatory Takings in
Canada, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 477, 491 (2006) (“The conclusion is
clear: property rights are minimally protected under the Canadian Constitution.
Moreover, quasi-constitutional documents such as the Canadian Bill of Rights and
the Quebec Charter offer minimal protection. As a result, Canadian courts have no
solid grounds to begin to develop an aggressive ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine. On
the contrary, constitutional legal developments have signaled that the protection of
property rights is ultimately left to democratically elected legislatures. Local
legislators that fail to work to protect property rights are likely to lose confidence
among their constituents and to lose the business of potential foreign investors.
However, judges will not find protections of property rights where none are
explicitly provided for.”).
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by international courts. Such a rule is exceedingly broad in terms of
the power it shifts from the national to the international, and deserves
more debate than it has seen so far.
The international investment law system is at a cross-roads, with
major debates taking place in the context of the Trans Pacific
Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.
These debates will help shape the future of the system and present a
great opportunity to create a system that matches up with the real
foreign investment issues of today.

